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We consider the problem of fairly allocating a bundle of privately appropriable
and inﬁnitely divisible goods among a group of agents with “classical” preferences.
We propose to measure an agent’s “sacriﬁce” at an allocation by the size of the set
of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption. As a solution, we
select the allocations at which sacriﬁces are equal across agents and this common
sacriﬁce is minimal. We then turn to the manipulability of this solution. In the tra-
dition of Hurwicz (1972, Decision and Organization, U. Minnesota Press), we identify
the equilibrium allocations of the manipulation game associated with this solution
when all commodities are normal: (i) for each preference proﬁle, each equal-division
constrained Walrasian allocation is an equilibrium allocation; (ii) conversely, each
equilibrium allocation is equal-division constrained Walrasian. (iii) Furthermore, we
show that if normality of goods is dropped, then equilibrium allocations may not be
eﬃcient.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D63.
Key-words: equal-sacriﬁce solution; manipulation game; equal-division Walrasian
solution.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of fairlyallocating a bundle of privatelyappropriable and in-
ﬁnitelydivisible goods among a group of agents having equal rights on these goods. To
make the objective of fairness operational, we propose to measure the sacriﬁce made by
an agent at an allocation bythe size of the se t of feasible bundles that she prefers to her
assignment, and to select the allocations at which sacriﬁces are equal across agents and
this common sacriﬁce is minimal. We refer to the resulting solution as the “equal-sacriﬁce”
solution.
First, we prove that the equal-sacriﬁce solution is well-deﬁned under general assump-
tions on preferences, and that under some very mild additional monotonicityassumptions,
equal-sacriﬁce allocations are also eﬃcient.
Crawford (1980) advocates, for the two-agent case, the rule that selects, from the
one of agent 1’s indiﬀerence curves that divides the Edgeworth box into two regions of
equal volumes, the allocation preferred byagent 2. This proposal suﬀers from treating
the two agents asymmetrically, and it is not easily generalized to more than two agents.
Nevertheless, basing the choice of an allocation on the size of upper contour sets is a natural
assumption that we have retained. We have adapted it to handle arbitrarypopulations,
and done so in a manner that delivers a symmetric treatment of agents. Our solution can
also be thought of as a member of the following family. Specify for each agent a function
that represents her preferences, a “welfare index” for her. Then, select the allocations
at which these welfare indices take a common value, and this common value is maximal
among all feasible allocations.
We then turn to the question of manipulability. To each rule can be associated a manip-
ulation “game form” as follows: the strategyspace of each agent is the space of preferences
satisfying the properties that her relation is known to satisfy; the outcome function is the
rule itself. If in this game, it is a dominant strategyfor each agent to announce her true
preferences, we saythat the rule is “strategy -proof”. It is well-known that on the domain
on which we are operating, strategy-proofness is very restrictive. Indeed, no selection from
the correspondence that associates with each economyits set of eﬃcient allocations at
which each agent ﬁnds her consumption at least as desirable as her endowment, is strat-
egy-proof (Hurwicz, 1972, Serizawa, 2002). This conclusion also applies to all selections
from the Pareto solution satisfying “equal treatment of equals” (Serizawa, 2002).1 It fol-
lows from this latter result that the equal-sacriﬁce solution is not strategy-proof. It is of
course easyto construct examples directlyesta blishing this fact, and we will provide some.
1Barber` aa n dJ a c k s o n(1995) drop eﬃciency and provide a characterizationof the class of strategy-proof
rules in the two-agent case, and under some additional property in the case of more than two agents.
1The studyof a solution should not stop with the observation that it is not strategy -
proof, however. A violation of this propertysi mplymeans that there are preference proﬁles
such that, if all agents but possiblyone tell the truth about their preferences, the last agent
maybeneﬁt for not doing so. However, what should reallyconcern us is not so much that
agents maynot be truthful, but rather that the allocations that the solution would specify
for the true proﬁle maynot be reached. Thus, a determination of which allocations will be
obtained is called for. Onlyknowing that an agent maybeneﬁt bybehaving strategically ,
keeping ﬁxed the announcements made bythe o thers, does not suﬃce for that purpose.
Several agents maybe in that position, and anyagent who is considering misrepresenting
her preferences has to entertain the thought that others could do the same, and should
take that fact into consideration when selecting her strategy. Consequently, we are led to
associating with the solution a manipulation game, identifying its equilibria, and evaluating
them in terms of the true preference proﬁle.
Thus, the second objective of this paper is to characterize, for each preference proﬁle,
the equilibria of the manipulation game associated with the equal-sacriﬁce solution for that
proﬁle. We achieve this under the assumption that all goods are normal. Our main result
is the following: the set of equilibrium outcomes of the manipulation game associated with
the equal-sacriﬁce solution coincides with the set of equal-division constrained Walrasian
allocations for the true preferences!2
It is not uncommon that the equilibria of a manipulation game associated with an
allocation rule contain the equal-division constrained Walrasian allocations (see below).
Thus, the striking part of our results is the converse inclusion. No other allocation is
reached at equilibrium. Typically, manipulation does not lead to such a relatively happy
conclusion (these allocations, besides being eﬃcient, have been a focal point in axiomatic
studies of fair allocation). For instance, for each preference proﬁle, the equilibrium alloca-
tions of a game similarlyassociated with the Walrasian solution itself are not necessarily
constrained Walrasian for that proﬁle. (In the two-agent case, theyare all the allocations
in the lens-shaped area deﬁned bythe true oﬀer curves, as shown by Hurwicz, 1972.)
The following observations should provide some intuition for our result. First, the
equal-sacriﬁce solution is very“sensitive”. In particular, anychange in anyagent’s indif-
ference curve through her assigned bundle at some proﬁle is likelyto bring about a change
2A constrained Walrasian allocation is deﬁned as a Walrasian allocation except that maximization
of preferences takes place in “truncated” budget sets. Only consumption bundles that are part of a
feasible allocation and meet the budget constraint are admissible. This variant of the Walrasian solution,
introduced by Hurwicz (1979), only diﬀers from it when some agents consume on the boundary of their
consumption sets.
2in the allocation the rule selects.3 Moreover, if an agent’s announced indiﬀerence curve
through her assigned bundle is not linear, switching to a preference relation for which her
indiﬀerence curve through her assigned bundle is ﬂatter than it was originally(this is an
“anti-monotonic” transformation of her preferences at that point, where “monotonicity”
is understood in the sense of Maskin, 1999), increases the agent’s apparent sacriﬁce. This
calls for her sacriﬁce to be reduced. It is tempting at this point to conclude that equilibrium
has to occur when all announcements are linear. One more step is needed however—and
it turns out to be a technicallydelicate one—b ecause a reduction in an agent’s sacriﬁce in
terms of preferences to which she mayswitch does not necessarilycaus e a parallel reduction
in terms of her true preferences, which is what reallymatters to her. What is needed is an
understanding of the circumstances under which this implication does hold. This is where
the assumption of normalityof goods comes into play . Under that assumption, the agent
will indeed beneﬁt. We also show that this assumption is necessary. Without it—and we
give examples—equilibria exist involving non-linear preferences and whose outcomes are
not constrained equal-division Walrasian for the true preferences.
2 Related literature
The manipulabilityof allocation rules on various domains has been the object of a number
of studies.
In the context of exchange economies, earlystudies are Sobel (1981), for two agents,
and Thomson (1984, 1987, 1988) for quasi-linear preferences. Constrained Walrasian allo-
cations (or equal-income constrained Walrasian allocations) are shown to be equilibrium
allocations, but there can be others. More recent papers have dealt with the manipulability
of solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem (Sobel, 2001, Kıbrıs, 2002) and have also derived
equal-income constrained Walrasian allocations as equilibrium allocations.4 This is why
earlier we wrote that our conclusion that these allocations are equilibrium allocations of
the game associated with the equal-sacriﬁce solution is not the surprising part. What is
remarkable is that there are no other equilibrium allocations. We noted above that for
two agents and for each speciﬁcation of their preferences, the equilibrium allocations of the
game associated with the Walrasian rule are delimited bythe true oﬀer curves. This region
does contain the true Walrasian allocations but it also contains the endowment allocation,
3The sensitivity of our solution explains in part the diﬀerence between the conclusions we reach for
it and what we know about the Walrasian solution. These issues are discussed by Thomson (1984), who
shows the relevance of Maskin-monotonicity to the characterization of the set of equilibria.
4See also Crawford and Varian (1979) for an earlier study of the manipulation of utility functions in
the context of bargaining.
3and a continuum of allocations in between. Thus, Pareto eﬃciencyis a possible outcome
but it mayalso be that no gains from trade are achieved at equilibrium.
The context of the allocation of a single inﬁnitelydivisible good when agents have single-
peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1983) is a rare one in which a strategy-proof rule exists. It
is called the uniform rule. Other rules that have been proposed as providing fair outcomes
for this class of problems. It so happens that for each preference proﬁle, the manipulation
game associated with a number of these rules has a unique equilibrium allocation, which
is none other than the uniform allocation for that proﬁle (Thomson, 1990, Bochet and
Sakai, 2008.) Consequently, not only does manipulation not necessarilycause violations of
eﬃciency, but it leads to a rule that has a number of other desirable properties (Thomson,
2006, provides an overview of these properties.) The similaritybetween these results and
the main result of the current paper is due, in part, to the fact that the uniform rule can
be thought of as a counterpart for the single-peaked model of the Walrasian concept when
operated from equal division.
The problem of allocating an indivisible good when monetarycompensations are feasi-
ble is studied by Tadenuma and Thomson (1995). Consider an allocation rule that selects
envy-free allocations. Then, the equilibrium correspondence of its associated manipula-
tion game is the entire no-envysolution. This conclusion can also be related to our main
result. Indeed, for that model, the no-envysolution coincides with the equal-income Wal-
rasian solution (Svensson, 1983). Nevertheless, no such coincidence takes place in either
the classical model or the model with which we are concerned here.
In the context of matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), no selection from the stable
solution exists that is strategy-proof. However, for each preference proﬁle, the set of
undominated Nash equilibria of the manipulation game associated with either the “man-
optimal” rule or the “woman-optimal” rule is the entire set of stable outcomes for that
proﬁle (Roth, 1984, Gale and Sotomayor, 1985.) Moreover, the set of Nash equilibria is
the entire set of individuallyrational outcomes for the true preferences ( Alcalde, 1996).
The manipulabilityof solutions has been studied under alternative behavioral assump-
tions. Crawford (1980) shows that for the rule that he had deﬁned (see above), under
maximin behavior, agent 1 would announce the one of her true indiﬀerence curves that
divides the Edgeworth box into equal areas (volumes). The behavioral assumption under
which he addresses the manipulation issue supposes an extreme form of risk aversion. We
have found it more natural to assume Nash behavior.
Manipulation of preferences in economies with public goods is studied by Thomson
(1979) and manipulation through endowments by Postlewaite (1979)a n dThomson (1987).
Manipulation of voting procedures is studied by Sanver and Zwicker (2004).
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3.1 The environment
We consider the problem of allocating a ﬁxed social endowment Ω ≡ (Ω1,...,Ω𝐾) ∈ ℝ𝐾
++,
for some 𝐾 ∈ ℕ, among a group of agents 𝑁 ≡{ 1,...,𝑛}. Their preferences are complete
and transitive binaryrelations on ℝ𝐾
+. The generic preference is 𝑅0. The symmetric and
asymmetric parts of 𝑅0 are 𝐼0 and 𝑃0 respectively. A preference𝑅0 is monotone if for each
{𝑏,𝑏′}⊂ℝ𝐾
+, 𝑏′ ≥ 𝑏 implies 𝑏′ 𝑅0 𝑏,a n d𝑏′ ≫ 𝑏 implies 𝑏′ 𝑃0 𝑏.5 Let 퓤 denote the domain
of convex, continuous, and monotone preferences. A preference 𝑅0 ∈??is semi-strictly
monotone if for each {𝑏,𝑏′}⊂ℝ𝐾
+ such that 𝑏′ ⪈ 𝑏,i f𝑏𝑃 0 0, then 𝑏′ 𝑃0 𝑏. The sub-domain
of ?? of semi-strictlymonotone preferences is 퓡.6
For each 𝑅0 ∈??and each 𝑏 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+,t h eindiﬀerence set of 𝑹0 at ?? is 𝐼(𝑅𝑖,𝑏) ≡{ 𝑏′ ∈
ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑏′ 𝐼0 𝑏} and the constrained indiﬀerence set of 𝑹0 at ?? is 𝐼𝑐(𝑅0,𝑏) ≡{ 𝑏′ ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ :
𝑏′ 𝐼0 𝑏, 𝑏′ ≤ Ω}.T h eupper contour set of 𝑹0 at ?? is 𝑈(𝑅0,𝑏) ≡{ 𝑏′ ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑏′ 𝑅0 𝑏} and
the constrained upper contour set of 𝑹0 at ?? is 𝑈𝑐(𝑅0,𝑏) ≡{ 𝑏′ ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑏′ 𝑅0 𝑏, 𝑏′ ≤ Ω}.
The strict upper contour set of 𝑹0 at ?? is 𝑈(𝑃0,𝑏) ≡{ 𝑏′ ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑏′ 𝑃0 𝑏} and the
constrained strict upper contour set of 𝑹0 at ?? is 𝑈𝑐(𝑃0,𝑏) ≡{ 𝑏′ ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑏′ 𝑃0 𝑏, 𝑏′ ≤
Ω}.
Let 𝑅0 ∈ℛ , 𝑏 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+,a n d𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+.T h e set of prices that support 𝑼(𝑹0,??)
at ?? is Supp(𝑹0,??).A n income expansion path for 𝑹0 at prices ?? is a function
𝑉 : ℝ+ → ℝ𝐾
+, such that for each 𝑤 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑤 = 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑉 (𝑤)a n d𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅0,𝑉(𝑤)); 𝑉 is
quasi-strictly increasing if its component functions {𝑉𝑘}𝐾
𝑘=1 are strictlyincreasing up
to a possible “ﬂat part” containing the origin. Formally, 𝑉 is quasi-strictlyincreasing if
for each each 𝑘 ∈{ 1,...,𝐾},a n de a c h{𝑤,𝑤′}⊂𝑅+ such that 𝑤<𝑤 ′,0<𝑉 𝑘(𝑤) implies
𝑉𝑘(𝑤) <𝑉 𝑘(𝑤′).
We consider four additional preference domains.
∙ A preference 𝑅0 has quasi-strictly increasing income expansion paths (i.e.,
all goods are normal) if for each 𝑏 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ ∖{ 0} and each 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅0,𝑏), there
is a quasi-strictlyincreasing income expansion path for 𝑅0 at prices 𝑝 that passes
through 𝑏.7 Let 퓘 be the domain of preferences in ℛ with quasi-strictlyincreasing
5We use the following vector inequalities. For each 𝐿 ∈ ℕ and each {𝑥,𝑥′}⊂ℝ𝐿: 𝑥′ ≥ 𝑥 if for each
𝑙 ∈{ 1,...,𝐿}, 𝑥′
𝑙 ≥ 𝑥𝑙; 𝑥′ ⪈ 𝑥 if 𝑥′ ≥ 𝑥 and 𝑥′ ∕= 𝑥;a n d𝑥′ ≫ 𝑥 if for each 𝑙 ∈{ 1,...,𝐿}, 𝑥′
𝑙 >𝑥 𝑙.
6Semi-strict monotonicity of 𝑅0 is weaker than strict monotonicity of 𝑅0, which says that for each
{𝑥,𝑦}⊂ℝ𝐾
+ such that 𝑥 ⪈ 𝑦, 𝑥𝑃 0 𝑦. For instance, Cobb-Douglas preferences are semi-strictly monotone,
but not strictly monotone (violations of the strict form of the property occur on the boundary.)
7Observe that if 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++ and 𝑅0 ∈ℛ , then each income expansion path relative to prices 𝑝 that passes
through 𝑏 starts at 0 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+.
5income expansion paths.
∙ A preference 𝑅0 is smooth if for each 𝑏 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++, there is a unique 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++ that
supports 𝑈(𝑅0,𝑏)a t𝑏, i.e., ∣Supp(𝑅0,𝑏)∣ =1 . L e t퓢 be the domain of smooth
preferences in ℛ.
∙ A preference 𝑅0 is homothetic if for each 𝑏 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ ∖{ 0} and each 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅0,𝑏),
the raypassing through 𝑏 is an income expansion path for 𝑅0 at prices 𝑝.8 Let 퓗 be
the domain of homothetic preferences in ℛ.
∙ A preference 𝑅0 is a positively oriented linear preference,i ft h e r ei s𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++
such that for each {𝑏,𝑏′}⊂𝑅𝐾
+, 𝑏𝑅 0 𝑏′ if and onlyif 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑏 ≥ 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑏′.F o re a c h𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++,
the linear preference associated with 𝑝 is 𝐿𝑝.L e t 퓛 be the domain of positively
oriented linear preferences.9
Lemma 9 in Appendix states that ℋ ⊊ ℐ, and thus the following inclusion relations hold
among the preference domains above: ℒ ⊊ ℋ ⊊ ℐ ⊊ ℛ and ℒ ⊊ ?? ⊊ ℛ.
Agent 𝑖’s generic preference is 𝑅𝑖 ∈?? , and the generic preference proﬁle is 𝑅 ≡
(𝑅𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 ∈?? 𝑁.F o re a c h𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁,e a c h𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,a n de a c h𝑅′
𝑖 ∈??, the proﬁle (𝑅−𝑖,𝑅 ′
𝑖) ∈?? 𝑁
is obtained from 𝑅 byreplacing 𝑅𝑖 by 𝑅′
𝑖.





𝑖∈𝑁 𝑧𝑖 ≤ Ω}.
Agent 𝑖’s allotment at 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 is 𝑧𝑖 ≡ (𝑧𝑘
𝑖 )𝐾
𝑘=1 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+.A solution associates to each
preference proﬁle a non-emptysubset of 𝑍. The generic solution is 𝐹.Aselector 𝑓 from
a solution 𝐹 is a function that associates with each 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 an element of 𝐹(𝑅). We write
𝑓 ∈ 𝐹.
A solution 𝐹 is essentially single-valued if for each 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁,e a c h{𝑧,𝑧′}⊆𝐹(𝑅),
and each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧𝐼 𝑖 𝑧′.
3.2 Manipulation of a solution
When a solution 𝐹 recommends for a particular economya set of allocations, as opposed
to a singleton, one has to ask the question: how will agents manipulate 𝐹?C o n s i d e r
some proﬁle of announced preferences. Suppose that a given 𝐹-optimal allocation, say 𝑧,
is chosen for that proﬁle. If an agent unilaterallydeviates, and the set of 𝐹-optimal
allocations for the new proﬁle is not a singleton, then there could be some allocations in
8Since indiﬀerence sets with linear pieces are allowed for preferences in ℛ, then for a given price vector,
income expansion paths are not necessarily unique.
9Observe that linear preferences with indiﬀerence sets parallel to some coordinate subspaces are not
included in ℒ.M o r e o v e r ,ℒ⊂ℛ .
6the set at which she is better oﬀ, some at which she is worse oﬀ, and some at which her
welfare is unaﬀected.10
Several behavioral assumptions can be formulated to deal with this indeterminacy. For
instance, one can suppose that the agent is optimistic, i.e., given the others’ reports, if by
reporting diﬀerent preferences, there is at least one 𝐹-optimal allocation for the new proﬁle
that she prefers to 𝑧, then she will not stick with her initial announcement. Alternatively,
one can suppose that she will switch onlyif she prefers all of the 𝐹-optimal allocations for
the new proﬁle to 𝑧. Of course, one can think of yet other behavioral assumptions.
We solve this issue in a waythat by passes anyspeculation about which behavioral
assumption is the most appropriate. We complete the allocation process byassuming
that each agent is asked to report not onlyhe r preferences, but also a bundle, which we
interpret as the one she would like to receive. Moreover, we add to the speciﬁcation of
the outcome function a “selector” to break ties between the 𝐹-optimal outcomes for the
reported preferences when the 𝐹-optimal set is not a singleton and the proﬁle of reported
bundles is not in this set. Now the outcome function is complete: if the proﬁle of reported
bundles is an 𝐹-optimal allocation for the proﬁle of reported preferences, then it is the
outcome of the allocation process; otherwise, the selector determines this outcome.
Adding a selector allows us to understand the strength of the behavioral assumptions
in the strategic analysis of solutions. If the outcomes that obtain at equilibrium are inde-
pendent of this selector, then these outcomes will result under anyof the aforementioned
behavioral assumptions. In Section 5 we show that this is the case for the equal-sacriﬁce
solution in the domain of preferences with quasi-strictlyincreasing income expansion paths.
For a given solution and one of its selectors, we now formallydeﬁne the game form
associated with them for some domain of preferences. Let ??⊆??be a domain, 𝐹 a solution,
and 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹.T h egame form ⟨𝑺(퓓)𝑵,𝑭??⟩ is deﬁned as follows: (𝑖) each agent’s strategy
space is 𝑺(퓓) ≡??×ℝ𝐾





𝑧 if 𝑧 ∈ 𝐹(𝑅)
𝑓(𝑅)o t h e r w i s e .
For each 𝑅0 ∈?? 𝑁,t h egame ⟨𝑺(퓓)𝑵,𝑭??,𝑹 0⟩ is obtained byaugmenting the game form
⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐹𝑓⟩ bythe preference proﬁle 𝑅0.
A Nash equilibrium of ⟨𝑺(퓓)𝑵,𝑭??,𝑹 0⟩ is a strategyproﬁle ( 𝑅,𝑧) ∈ 𝑆(??)𝑁,s u c h
10This issue arises even for an essentially single-valued solution. For such a solution, agents are seemingly
indiﬀerent among the recommended allocations under the reported preferences, but this could not be the
case for their true preferences.














For each game ⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐹𝑓,𝑅 0⟩,t h es e to fNash equilibria is 퓝⟨𝑺(퓓)𝑵,𝑭??,𝑹 0⟩
and the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is 퓞⟨𝑺(퓓)𝑵,𝑭??,𝑹 0⟩.
If for each pair of selectors of 𝐹, 𝑓 and 𝑔, ??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐹𝑓,𝑅 0⟩ = ??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐹𝑔,𝑅 0⟩,w e
denote this common set by 퓞⟨𝑺(퓓)𝑵,𝑭,𝑹 0⟩.
3.3 Additional notation
For each pair {𝑥1,𝑥 2}⊂ℝ𝐾
+,l e tseg[??1,?? 2] be the segment connecting 𝑥1 and 𝑥2.F o r
each list {𝑥1,𝑥 2,...,𝑥 𝑙}⊂ℝ𝐾
+,l e tbro.seg[??1,?? 2,...,?? ??] be the broken segment con-
necting these points in that order, and let con.hull{??1,?? 2,...,?? ??} be the convex hull
of {𝑥1,𝑥 2,...,𝑥 𝑙}. Finally, for each pair of vectors {𝑥1,𝑥 2}⊂ℝ𝐾
+ such that 𝑥1 ≤ 𝑥2,l e t
rec{??1,?? 2} be the rectangle {𝑦 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑥1 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥2}.F o re a c h𝑏 ∈ ℝ2
+ and each 𝑚 ∈ ℝ+,
let ray{??,??} be the rayemanating from 𝑏 with slope 𝑚.
4 The equal-sacriﬁce solution
The Pareto solution, 𝑷,a n dt h eweak Pareto solution, 𝑷 ??, are deﬁned as usual: for
each 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁 and each 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑃(𝑅) if and onlyif there is no 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍 such that (i) for
each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′
𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝑧𝑖, and (ii) there is 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 such that 𝑧′
𝑗 𝑃𝑗 𝑧𝑗; 𝑧 ∈ 𝑃 𝑤(𝑅) if and onlyif
there is no 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍 such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′
𝑖 𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖.
Let 𝜇 be the Lebesgue measure on ℝ𝐾.F o r e a c h 𝑅0 ∈??and each 𝑏 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+,l e t
??(𝑹0,??) ≡ 𝜇(𝑈𝑐(𝑅0,𝑏)), i.e., the size of the constrained upper contour set of 𝑅0 at 𝑏.
Since resources are owned collectivelyin ou r model, then when an agent with preferences
𝑅0 consumes 𝑏, she “sacriﬁces” her option of consuming the bundles in 𝑈𝑐(𝑅0,𝑏). Thus,
𝑎(𝑅0,𝑏) is a reasonable measure of the sacriﬁce of 𝑅0 at 𝑏, the measure that assigns equal
weights to all bundles.
For each 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁,l e tΨ ( 𝑅) be the set of feasible allocations at which sacriﬁces are
equal across agents, i.e., Ψ(𝑅) ≡{ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 :f o re a c h{𝑖,𝑗}⊆𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧 𝑗)}.T h e
equal-sacriﬁce solution, 𝑬, associates with each 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁 the set of allocations at which
sacriﬁces are equal across agents, and this common sacriﬁce is minimal:
𝐸(𝑅) ≡
{
𝑧 ∈ Ψ(𝑅):f o re a c h{𝑖,𝑗}⊆𝑁 and each 𝑧





The following theorem states that 𝐸 is a well-deﬁned and essentially single-valued solution.
We present the proof in Appendix.
8Theorem 1. For each 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁, 𝐸(𝑅) ∕= ∅.M o r e o v e r ,𝐸 is essentiallysingle-valued.
The following lemma concerns eﬃciencyproperties of the equal-sacriﬁce allocations.
First, theyare weaklyPareto eﬃcient. Second, the lemma identiﬁes two wide classes of
economies in which theyare in fact Pareto eﬃcient. 11
Lemma 1. Let 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁. Then, (i) 𝐸(𝑅) ⊆ 𝑃 𝑤(𝑅), and (ii) If ∣𝑁∣ =2o r𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁,t h e n
𝐸(𝑅) ⊆ 𝑃(𝑅).
The following lemma is an application of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics. We present the proof in Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅). Then, (i) for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,Ω 𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0, (ii)
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑧𝑖 = Ω, and (iii) there is 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++ such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖).
The equal-division constrained Walrasian solution, 𝑾 ??
????, associates with each
𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁 the set of allocations
𝑊
𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅) ≡{ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 : ∃𝑝 ∈ ℝ
𝐾
+ s.t. for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each 𝑧
′
𝑖 ∈ 𝑈




The following lemma is a consequence of the monotonicityproperties of preferences in
the domain ℛ. We omit the straightforward proof.
Lemma 3. Let 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅). Then, (i)
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑧𝑖 = Ω, and (ii) if 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+
supports 𝑧 as a member of 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅), then 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++.
5 The manipulability of the equal-sacriﬁce solution
Our main theorem characterizes the equilibrium correspondence of the manipulation game
associated with the equal-sacriﬁce solution on the domain ℐ. For each preference proﬁle
in ℐ𝑁, each equal-division constrained Walrasian allocation is an equilibrium allocation.
Conversely, for each selector𝑒 ∈ 𝐸, each equilibrium allocation of the game associated with
the equal-sacriﬁce solution and 𝑒 and the proﬁle is an equal-division constrained Walrasian
allocation for that proﬁle.
11The equal-sacriﬁce solution may select weakly Pareto eﬃcient allocations that are not Pareto eﬃcient
when there are at least three agents and preferences are in ??∖ℛ .L e t( 𝑅𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 ∈?? 𝑁 and for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,
let 𝑢𝑖 be the function deﬁned by: for each 𝑧𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+, 𝑢𝑖(𝑧𝑖) ≡ 𝜇(rec{0,Ω}) − 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖). It is easily seen
that 𝐸(𝑅) contains the allocations whose image under (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 is the Kalai-Smorodinsky (K-S) bargaining
solution for the comprehensive hull of the convex problem 𝑢(𝑍). It is well known that K-S may select
weakly eﬃcient allocations that are not eﬃcient for more than three agents on the convex domain. An
example showing this fact is easily adapted to prove the parallel statement for 𝐸.








Since the characterization above is independent of the particular selector from 𝐸,t h e n
we conclude that these are the outcomes that result from the manipulation of this solution.
The following corollarystates this result.







The proof of Theorem 2 follows from four lemmas.
Let 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 and 𝑅0 ∈ℐ 𝑁. Our ﬁrst lemma identiﬁes proﬁles of actions that do not
constitute equilibria of game ⟨𝑆(ℐ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩. It states conditions under which at least
one agent can beneﬁt bychanging her action.
Lemma 4. Let ??⊆ℛbe such that ℋ⊆??and 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸.L e t𝑅0 ∈?? 𝑁 and (𝑅,𝑧) ∈ 𝑆(??)𝑁.
If there are 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍, 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++,a n d𝑎 ∈ ℝ++ such that:
(1) for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, 𝑝 supports 𝑈(𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗)a t𝑧′
𝑗,









then (𝑅,𝑧) ∕∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.













Let 𝗼 ∈ [0,1) and 𝐴 be the set obtained bytranslating the boundaryof ℝ𝐾
+ so that the
origin is translated to 𝑧′
𝑖, i.e., 𝐴 ≡{ 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑧′
𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑖}∖{ 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑧′
𝑖 ≪ 𝑥𝑖}.F o re a c hr a y
in the direction of a strictlypositive vector, 𝑟,t h e𝜶-convex combination of 𝑨 and
𝑰(𝑳??,?? ′
??) through ?? is the point in ℝ𝐾
+ obtained as a convex combination of 𝑟 ∩ 𝐴 with
weight 𝗼 and 𝑟 ∩ 𝐼(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
𝑖)w i t hw e i g h t1− 𝗼.L e t 𝐴𝗼 be the set obtained bytaking 𝗼-
convex combinations of 𝐴 and 𝐼(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
𝑖) through all the strictlypositive ray s. Let 𝑅𝑖(𝗼)b e
the preference whose indiﬀerence set through the origin is the boundaryof ℝ𝐾
+ and whose
indiﬀerence sets in the interior of ℝ𝐾
+ are obtained as homothetic images of 𝐴𝗼. Clearly
10𝑅𝑖(𝗼) is homothetic and such that 𝐼(𝑅𝑖(𝗼),𝑧′
𝑖)=𝐴𝗼. The function 𝗼  → 𝑎(𝑅𝑖(𝗼),𝑧′
𝑖)i s
continuous and as 𝗼 → 1, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖(𝗼),𝑧′
𝑖) → 𝜇(rec{𝑧′




𝑖). Thus, bythe Intermediate Value Theorem, there is 𝗽 ∈ (0,1)
such that 𝑎(𝑅𝑖(𝗽),𝑧′
𝑖)=𝑎.L e t𝑅′





𝑖), then 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′




𝑖)=𝑎, then byhy pothesis (2), 𝑧′ ∈ 𝐸𝑖(𝑅−𝑖,𝑅 ′
𝑖). Byconstruction,
the upper contour set of 𝑅′
𝑖 at 𝑧′








𝑖 = 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′
𝑖} = {𝑧′
𝑖}.L e t𝑧′′ ∈ 𝐸(𝑅−𝑖,𝑅 ′
𝑖). We prove that
𝑧′′
𝑖 = 𝑧′
𝑖. Since for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁∖{𝑖}, 𝑧′′
𝑗 𝐼𝑗 𝑧′




𝑖 ≤ 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′





𝑖,t h e n𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′
𝑖 ≤ 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′′
𝑖 .T h u s ,𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′











(𝑅,𝑧) ∕∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.
The next lemma states that if a domain ??⊆ℐis such that ℋ⊆?? , then, for each
𝑒 ∈ 𝐸, at each equilibrium of ⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩, agents report parallel linear indiﬀerence
sets through their consumption bundles within the “feasible box,” i.e., the set rec{0,Ω}.
Lemma 5. Let ??⊆ℐbe such that ℋ⊆?? .L e t 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 and 𝑅0 ∈ℛ 𝑁.I f 𝑧 ∈





Proof. Let (𝑅,𝑧∗) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.L e t𝑧 ≡ 𝐸𝑒(𝑅,𝑧∗). ByLemma 2,f o re a c h𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,
𝑧𝑖 ⪈ 0a n dt h e r ei s𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++ such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖). We claim that
for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝐼𝑐(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝐼𝑐(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖). Suppose bycontradiction that there is 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 for
whom 𝐼𝑐(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖) ∕= 𝐼𝑐(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖). ByLemma 2,Ω𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0. Since preferences are semi-strictly
monotone, then 𝜇(rec{𝑧𝑖,Ω}) <𝑎 (𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖). Moreover, since preferences are continuous, then
𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖) <𝑎 (𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖). Let 𝗿 ≡ 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖) − 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖) > 0.
For each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖},l e t𝑉𝑗 be a quasi-strictlyincreasing income expansion path for
𝑅𝑗 at prices 𝑝 that passes through 𝑧𝑗.13 Since preferences are continuous, then for each
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{𝑖}, the function 𝑤 ∈ ℝ+  → 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑉 𝑗(𝑤)) is continuous.14 Let 𝜂 ∈ ℝ+ be such that
𝜂<
𝗿
2.S i n c e𝗿<𝜇 (rec{0,Ω}) − 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖), then bythe Intermediate Value Theorem, there
are (𝑤
𝜂
𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁∖{𝑖} ≪ (𝑝⋅𝑧𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁∖{𝑖} such that for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁∖{𝑖}, 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑉 𝑗(𝑤
𝜂
𝑗)) = 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧 𝑗)+𝜂.
12𝑅′
𝑖 is semi-strictly monotone, but it is not strictly monotone. It is easy to construct a preference 𝑅′′
𝑖
with the same properties as 𝑅′
𝑖 but strictly monotone.
13These income expansion paths exist because 𝑅 ∈ℐ 𝑁.
14Since preferences are continuous, then the function 𝑥𝑗 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+  → 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑥 𝑗) is continuous; since 𝑉𝑗 is








𝑗). Since each 𝑉𝑗 is quasi-strictlyincreasing, then for each
𝜂>0, 𝑧
𝜂
𝑖 ⪈ 𝑧𝑖. Since preferences are semi-strictlymonotone, then 𝑧
𝜂
𝑖 𝑃 0
𝑖 𝑧𝑖.O b s e r v et h a t
as 𝜂 → 0, 𝑧
𝜂
𝑖 → 𝑧𝑖.L e t𝜈>0 be such that 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖) − 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧𝜈
𝑖 ) <
𝗿
2.L e t 𝑧′
𝑖 ≡ 𝑧𝜈
𝑖 ,a n df o r
each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖},l e t𝑧′
𝑗 ≡ 𝑉𝑗(𝑤𝜈
𝑗). Clearly, 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍.L e t𝑎 ≡ 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)+𝜈. Byconstruction,
for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗)=𝑎.
Agent 𝑖 and the objects 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍, 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++,a n d𝑎 ∈ ℝ++ satisfythe ﬁrst three properties
in Lemma 4. We claim that theyalso satisfythe fourth property . Byconstruction of 𝑧′
and 𝑎, 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖) − 𝗿
2 <𝑎 (𝐿𝑝,𝑧′




2,t h e n𝑎 ≡ 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)+𝜈<𝑎 (𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
𝑖). Finally, since 𝑧′
𝑖 ≥
𝑧𝑖,t h e n𝜇(rec{𝑧′
𝑖,Ω}) ≤ 𝜇(rec{𝑧𝑖,Ω}) <𝑎 (𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖) <𝑎 . Thus, byLemma 4,( 𝑅,𝑧∗) ∕∈
??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩. This is a contradiction.
Let 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸. The following lemma states that if a domain ??⊆ℐis such that ℋ⊆?? ,
then all equilibrium allocations of ⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ are equal-division constrained Walrasian
for 𝑅0.








Proof. Let (𝑅,𝑧∗) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ and 𝑧 ≡ 𝐸𝑒(𝑅,𝑧∗). From Lemma 5,t h e r ei s
𝑝 ∈ ℝ++ such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝐼𝑐(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝐼𝑐(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖). Since 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅), then for each
{𝑖,𝑗}⊆𝑁, 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖)=𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑗). Thus, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑝 ⋅𝑧𝑖 = 𝑝 ⋅
Ω
𝑛 and then 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅).
We claim that 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0)a n d𝑝 supports 𝑧 as a member of 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0). That is, we claim
that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑃 0
𝑖 ,𝑧 𝑖), 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖 >𝑝⋅
Ω
𝑛. Suppose bycontradiction that
there is 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑃 0
𝑖 ,𝑧 𝑖) such that 𝑝⋅𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑝⋅ Ω
𝑛. Since preferences are continuous,
then we can suppose w.l.o.g. that 𝑥𝑖 ≫ 0. For each 𝗼 ∈ [0,1], let 𝑧𝗼
𝑖 ≡ 𝗼𝑥𝑖 +( 1− 𝗼)Ω.
Since 𝑅0
𝑖 is semi-strictlymonotone and 𝑥𝑖 ≪ Ω, then for each 𝗼 ∈ [0,1], 𝑧𝗼
𝑖 𝑃 0
𝑖 𝑧𝑖.A l s o ,
since 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑝 ⋅ Ω
𝑛, then bythe Intermediate Value Theorem, there is 𝗽 ∈ (0,1] such that
0 ≪ 𝑧
𝗽
𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑃 0
𝑖 ,𝑧 𝑖)a n d𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧
𝗽
𝑖 = 𝑝 ⋅
Ω
𝑛.F o r e a c h 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖},l e t𝑧
𝗽
𝑗 ≡ (Ω − 𝑧
𝗽
𝑖 )/(𝑛 − 1).
Thus, 𝑧𝗽 ∈ 𝑍. Moreover, for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧
𝗽
𝑗 = 𝑝 ⋅ Ω
𝑛 and 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅𝑗,𝑧
𝗽
𝑗 ).
For each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖},l e t𝑉𝑗 be a quasi-strictlyincreasing income expansion path for
𝑅𝑗 at prices 𝑝 that passes through 𝑧
𝗽
𝑗 .15 For each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, the function 𝑤 ∈ ℝ+  →
𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑉 𝑗(𝑤)), is continuous.16 Let 𝜂 ∈ (0,𝑎(𝐿𝑝, Ω
𝑛)). Bythe Intermediate Value Theorem,
there are (𝑤
𝜂
𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁∖{𝑖} ≫ (𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁∖{𝑖} such that for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑉 𝑗(𝑤
𝜂
𝑗)) =








𝑖 . Since each 𝑉𝑗 is quasi-strictlyincreasing,
15These income expansion paths exist because 𝑅 ∈ℐ 𝑁.
16See Footnote 14.













𝑗 .L e t 𝜈>0




𝑖 ≫ 0, and (iii) 𝑦𝜈
𝑖 𝑃 0
𝑖 𝑧𝑖.L e t𝑧′
𝑖 ≡ 𝑦𝜈
𝑖 and for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖},l e t𝑧′
𝑗 ≡ 𝑉𝑗(𝑤𝜈
𝑗). Clearly,
𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍.L e t 𝑎 ∈ ℝ++ be the common value of 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗)=𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧 𝑗) − 𝜈 = 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑗) − 𝜈
for 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁.S i n c e 𝑎<𝑎 (𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖)a n d𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧 𝑖) <𝑎 (𝐿𝑝,𝑧′





Agent 𝑖 and the objects 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍, 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++,a n d𝑎 ∈ ℝ++ satisfythe four properties in
Lemma 4.T h u s ,( 𝑅,𝑧∗) ∕∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩. This is a contradiction.
The following lemma states that if agents can report linear preferences, then all equal-
division constrained Walrasian allocations are equilibrium outcomes.








Proof. Let 𝑅0 ∈?? 𝑁 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0). We show that there is 𝑅 ∈ℒ 𝑁 such that (𝑅,𝑧) ∈
??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ and 𝐸𝑒(𝑅,𝑧)=𝑧.S i n c e 𝑧 ∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0), then byLemma 3,t h e r ei s
𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++ such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each 𝑧′
𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑃 0
𝑖 ,𝑧 𝑖), 𝑝⋅𝑧𝑖 >𝑝⋅ Ω
𝑛.L e t𝑅 ≡ (𝐿
𝑝
𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁.
Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑅′
𝑖 ∈?? ,a n d𝑧′ ∈ 𝐸(𝑅−𝑖,𝑅 ′
𝑖). Observe that for each {𝑗,𝑘}⊆𝑁∖{𝑖}, 𝑝⋅𝑧′
𝑗 = 𝑝⋅𝑧′
𝑘.
We claim that 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′
𝑖 ≤ 𝑝 ⋅ Ω
𝑛 and thus 𝑧𝑖 𝑅0
𝑖 𝑧′
𝑖. Suppose bycontradiction that 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧′
𝑖 >𝑝⋅ Ω
𝑛.
Thus, for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, 𝑎(𝐿𝑝, Ω
𝑛) <𝑎 (𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗). Eﬃciencyof 𝐸 implies 𝑝 supports
𝑈(𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖), i.e., for each 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖), 𝑝⋅𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑝⋅𝑧′
𝑖.T h u s ,𝑎(𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖) ≤ 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
𝑖) <𝑎 (𝐿𝑝, Ω
𝑛).
Consequently, for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{𝑖}, 𝑎(𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖) <𝑎 (𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗). This contradicts 𝑧′ ∈ 𝐸(𝑅−𝑖,𝑅 ′
𝑖).
Thus, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each (𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′






(𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩. Finally, since 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅), then 𝐸𝑒(𝑅,𝑧)=𝑧.
Now we can complete the proof of our main characterization.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 and ??≡ℐ .T h u s ,ℐ⊇??⊇ℋ⊇ℒ ,a n dt h e nb yL e m -
mas 6 and 7, ??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩⊆𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0) ⊆?? ⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.T h u s ,??⟨𝑆(ℐ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ =
𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0).
The following corollarycharacterizes the equilibrium outcomes of the manipulation
game associated with the equal-sacriﬁce solution on the domain of economies with homo-
thetic preferences.
Corollary 2. For each 𝑅0 ∈ℋ 𝑁 and each 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸, ??⟨𝑆(ℋ)𝑁,𝐸,𝑅 0⟩ = 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0)
Proof. Let 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 and ??≡ℋ .T h u s , ℐ⊇??⊇ℋ⊇ℒ , and then byLemmas 6 and 7,
??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩⊆𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0) ⊆?? ⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.T h u s ,??⟨𝑆(ℋ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ = 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0).
136 Discussion
Let 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸. In this section we show that if our assumptions on preferences of semi-strict
monotonicityand quasi-strictlyincreasing in come expansion paths are dropped, then equi-
librium outcomes of ⟨𝑆(??),𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ are not necessarilyequal-divi sion constrained Walrasian
for 𝑅0. We also show that this is so even if smoothness of preferences is required. We do
this bymeans of three examples.
The next lemma provides conditions that characterize the Nash equilibria in the two-
agent case when preferences are not necessarilysemi-strictly monotone. It facilitates the
presentation of the examples that follow.
Lemma 8. Assume 𝑁 ≡{ 1,2}.L e t ??⊆?? , 𝑅0 ∈?? 𝑁, 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁,a n d𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅)
be such that 𝑧1 + 𝑧2 = Ω. Suppose that for each 𝑧′
1 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑃 0
1,𝑧 1), and each 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+
supporting 𝑈𝑐(𝑅2,Ω − 𝑧′
1)a tΩ− 𝑧′
1, 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
1) <𝑎 (𝑅2,Ω − 𝑧′
1), and that the parallel
statement obtained byexchanging the roles of the two agents holds. Then for each 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,
(𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ and 𝑧 ∈?? ⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.
Proof. Let 𝑁, ??, 𝑅0, 𝑅,a n d𝑧 be as in the statement of the lemma. We claim that for
each 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,e a c h𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,a n de a c h( 𝑅′
𝑖,𝑧′






Suppose bycontradiction that the above statement is false for say , 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 and agent 1:
there are (𝑅′
1,𝑧′









1,𝑧 2) ∕= 𝐸𝑒
1(𝑅,𝑧). We claim that 𝐸𝑒(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2,𝑧′
1,𝑧 2) ∕=( 𝑧′
1,𝑧 2). Sup-
pose bycontradiction that 𝐸𝑒(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2,𝑧′
1,𝑧 2)=( 𝑧′
1,𝑧 2). Since 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 and 𝑧1 +𝑧2 =Ω ,t h e n
𝑧′





1,𝑧 2). This is a contradiction.
Since 𝐸𝑒(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2,𝑧′
1,,𝑧 2) ∕=( 𝑧′
1,𝑧 2), then 𝐸𝑒(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2,𝑧′
1,𝑧 2)=𝑒(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2). Let ˆ 𝑧 ≡
𝑒(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2). ByLemma 1,ˆ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑃(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2). Thus, there is 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ that supports 𝑈𝑐(𝑅2, ˆ 𝑧2)
at ˆ 𝑧2 and also supports 𝑈𝑐(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑧1)a tˆ 𝑧1.T h u s , 𝑎(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑧1) ≤ 𝑎(𝐿𝑝, ˆ 𝑧1). Moreover, byhy -
pothesis, 𝑎(𝐿𝑝, ˆ 𝑧1) <𝑎 (𝑅2, ˆ 𝑧2). Thus, 𝑎(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑧1) <𝑎 (𝑅2, ˆ 𝑧2)a n dˆ 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝐸(𝑅′
1,𝑅 2). This is a
contradiction.
The following example shows that in Theorem 2, semi-strict monotonicityof preferences
(??⊆ℛ ) cannot be replaced bymonotonicityof preferences ( ??⊆?? ).
Example 1. Let 𝑁 ≡{ 1,2} and Ω ≡ (1,1) ∈ ℝ2
++. We specify 𝑅0 ∈?? 𝑁 and construct a
proﬁle (𝑅,𝑧) ∈ (??×ℝ2
+)𝑁 such that preferences 𝑅 are homothetic but not semi-strictly
increasing, i.e., 𝑅 ∈ (??∖ℛ )𝑁,( 𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸,𝑅 0⟩, 𝑧 ∈?? ⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸,𝑅 0⟩, 𝐼𝑐(𝑅2,𝑧 2)
is not linear, and 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0).
∙ Specifying true preferences (Figure 1 (a)). Let 𝑞 ∈ ℝ2
++ be such that 𝑞1 >𝑞 2 and
𝑅0
1 ≡ 𝐿(𝑞1+1,𝑞2).L e t𝑅0
2 ∈??be the homothetic preference for which 𝐼(𝑅0
2,(0,1)) ≡{ (𝑥,1) ∈
ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑥 ∈ ℝ+}.



















































































Figure 1: Example 1.
∙ Specifying reported preferences. Let 𝑅1 ≡ 𝐿𝑞.L e t𝗼 ≡ seg[0,Ω] ∩ 𝐼(𝑅1,(0,1)). Let
𝑅2 ∈??be the homothetic preference such that 𝐼(𝑅2,(1,0)) ≡ bro.seg[(0,1),𝗼,(1,0)].
∙ Identifying an equilibrium outcome, 𝑧 (Figure 1 (b)). The function 𝑥 ∈ ℝ+  →
𝑎(𝑅1,(𝑥,0)) is continuous and strictlydecreasing on [
1
2,1]; also, the function 𝑥 ∈ ℝ+  →





2,0)) and 𝑎(𝑅1,(1,0)) <𝑎 (𝑅2,Ω − (1,0)). Thus, bythe Intermediate Value
Theorem, there is 𝑎 ∈ [1
2,1] such that 𝑎(𝑅1,(𝑎,0)) = 𝑎(𝑅2,Ω−(𝑎,0)). In Figure 1 (b), this
15is equivalent to the equalityof the measures of the two shaded areas forming a bow-tie.
Let 𝑧1 ≡ (𝑎,0) and 𝑧2 ≡ Ω − 𝑧1.
We claim that for each 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,( 𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.O b s e r v e t h a t 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅)
and that for each 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍, 𝑧2 𝑅0
2 𝑧′
2.T h u s ,𝑅2 is a best response to 𝑅1. ByLemma 8,i t
is enough to show that for each 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍 such that 𝑧′
1 𝑃 0




2,w eh a v e𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
1) <𝑎 (𝑅2,𝑧′
2). Let 𝗽 ≡ seg[(0,1),Ω] ∩ 𝐼(𝑅0
1,𝑧 1)a n d
𝗾 ≡ seg[𝑧1,𝗽] ∩ seg[0,Ω] (Figure 1 (c)). There are ﬁve cases.
Case 1: 𝑧′
1 ∈ con.hull{𝑧1,𝗾,Ω,(1,0)} but 𝑧′
1 ∕∈ bro.seg[(1,0),Ω,𝗾]( F i g u r e1 (c)).
Then, the unique 𝑝 ∈ ℝ2
+ (up to a positive scalar multiplication) supporting 𝑈𝑐(𝑅2,𝑧′
2)
at 𝑧′
2,i s𝑝 = 𝑞.S i n c e 𝑎(𝐿𝑞,𝑧′















1 ∈ seg[Ω,(1,0)], then 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
1) ≤ 𝑎(𝐿𝑞,𝑧′
1). Now, since 𝑎(𝐿𝑞,𝑧′
1) <𝑎 (𝐿𝑞,𝑧 1)=
























1 ∈ con.hull{𝗾,Ω,𝗽} but 𝑧′
1 ∕∈ bro.seg[𝗾,Ω,𝗽]. A symmetric argument to the
one in Case 1 applies.
Case 5: 𝑧′
1 ∈ seg[𝗽,Ω]. A symmetric argument to the one in Case 2 applies.
Concluding: Observe that 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃(𝑅0). Thus, 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0). □
The following example shows that in Lemma 5, the assumption that income expansion
paths be quasi-strictlyincreasing ( ??⊆ℐ ) cannot be dropped (cannot be replaced by
??⊆ℛ .)
Example 2. Let 𝑁 ≡{ 1,2} and Ω ≡ (1,1) ∈ ℝ2
++. We specify 𝑅0 ∈ℛ {1,2} and construct
(𝑅,𝑧) ∈ (ℛ∖ℐ×ℝ2
+){1,2} such that (𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸,𝑅 0⟩, 𝑧 ∈?? ⟨ 𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸,𝑅 0⟩,
𝐼𝑐(𝑅1,𝑧 1)a n d𝐼𝑐(𝑅2,𝑧 2) are not linear, and 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0).
∙ Specifying true preferences. Let 𝑅0
1 ∈ℋbe the homothetic preference whose upper
contour set at (1
5, 4
5) is the intersection of the upper contour sets of 𝐿(8,1) and 𝐿(4,3) (Fig-
ure 2 (a)). Let 𝑅0
2 ∈ℋbe the symmetric image of 𝑅0
1 with respect to the 45𝑜 line, i.e., for
each {𝑥,𝑦}⊂ℝ2
+, 𝑥𝑅 0
2 𝑦 if and onlyif ( 𝑥2,𝑥 1)𝑅0
1 (𝑦2,𝑦 1).

























is the set of points {(1
5𝜆, 4
5𝜆) ∈ ℝ2
+ : 𝜆 ≥ 1}.
16sets of 𝑅1 to the left of 𝑄 are linear with normal (2,1). The indiﬀerence sets of 𝑅1 to the
right of 𝑄 are linear with normal (4,3).































Let ˆ 𝑅1 ∈ℋbe the preference for which 𝐼( ˆ 𝑅1,(0, 6
5)) = 𝐼(𝑅1,(0, 6
5)). For each 𝑎 ∈]6
5,+∞[,
𝐼(𝑅1,(0,𝑎)) = 𝐼( ˆ 𝑅1,(0,𝑎)).
Now, 𝑅2 is the symmetric image of 𝑅1 with respect to the 45𝑜 line.
Claim 1: 𝑅 ∕∈ℐ . Indeed, (1,1) ∈ Supp(𝑅1,(1
5, 4




5) − Δ ⪈ 0, (1,1) ∕∈ Supp(𝑅𝑖,(0,1) − Δ). Thus, no quasi-strictlyincreasing path
of maximizers of 𝑅1 at prices (1,1) passes through (1
5, 4
5)( F i g u r e2 (b)).









Claim 2: (𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.O b s e r v et h a t𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅). Thus, byLemma 8




2 𝑧2,a n de a c h𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ supporting 𝑈𝑐(𝑅1,𝑒 1(𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)) at 𝑒1(𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2), we have
𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑒 2(𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)) <𝑎 (𝑅1,𝑒 1(𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)). Let 𝑅′
2 ∈ℛ , 𝑧′ ≡ 𝑒(𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2), and 𝐴 the “residual
complement” of the constrained upper contour set of 𝑅0


































There are three cases.
Case 1: 𝑧′





]( F i g u r e2 (d)). Then, the unique 𝑝 ∈ ℝ2
+
(up to positive scale multiplication) supporting 𝑈𝑐(𝑅1,𝑧′
1)a t𝑧′
1 is (2,1). Observe that
𝑎(𝐿(2,1),𝑧 2) <𝑎 (𝑅2,𝑧 2), i.e., of the two shaded sets forming a bow-tie in Figure 2 (c), the
measure of the upper set is greater than the measure of the lower one. Since 𝑎(𝐿(2,1),𝑧′
2) ≤













2 ∈ seg[(1,0),Ω], then 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑧′
2) ≤ 𝑎(𝐿(2,1),𝑧′


























Concluding: Since (0,1)𝑃 0
1 𝑧1 and (1,0)𝑃 0


























































































































Figure 2: Example 2.
Let 𝐹 be a solution. A selector 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 is an equal-division selector,i ff o re a c h
𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 such that 𝑧𝑒𝑑 ≡ 1
∣𝑁∣(Ω,...,Ω) ∈ 𝐹(𝑅), we have 𝑓(𝑅)=𝑧𝑒𝑑.
The following example shows that in Lemma 5, the assumption of quasi-strictlyin-
creasing expansion path (??⊆ℐ ) cannot be replaced bythe assumption of smoothness of
preferences (??⊆?? ).
Example 3. Let 𝑁 ≡{ 1,2}, 𝜆>4
√
2, and Ω ≡ (𝜆,𝜆) ∈ ℝ2
++. We specify 𝑅0 ∈?? 𝑁
and construct (𝑅,𝑧) ∈ (??∖ℐ×ℝ2
+){1,2} such that for each equal-division selector 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,
(𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩, 𝐼𝑐(𝑅1,𝑧 1)a n d𝐼𝑐(𝑅2,𝑧 2) are linear, and 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0).
∙ Specifying true preferences (Figure 3 (a)). Let 𝑅0
1 ∈ (ℋ∩??)𝑁 besuch that𝑈(𝑅0
1,(𝜆,0))∩
18{(𝑥1,𝑥 2) ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑥1+𝑥2 <𝜆 } ∕= ∅ and for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈(𝑅0
1,(𝜆,0))∩{(𝑥1,𝑥 2) ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : 𝑥1+𝑥2 ≤
𝜆}, ∣∣(𝜆,0)− 𝑥∣∣ < 1
2.L e t𝑅0
2 ≡ 𝐿(1,1) ∈ (ℋ∩??)𝑁.
∙ Specifying reported preferences (Figure 3 (b)). We construct ˆ 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍,
such that ( ˆ 𝑅,𝑧)=??⟨𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ and 𝑧 = ??⟨𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩; later we smooth out ˆ 𝑅
and construct 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁 such that (𝑅,𝑧)=??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ and 𝑧 ∈?? ⟨ 𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.
We ﬁrst specify ˆ 𝑅1 (Figure 3 (b)).











2); note that ∣∣(0,𝜆) − 𝗼∣∣ =1a n d∣∣𝗼 − 𝗽∣∣ =1 .
(ii) For each 𝑎 ∈]𝜆, 3




2 ,0)]. Observe that seg[𝑡(𝑎),(𝑡2(𝑎) −
√
2
2 ,0)] has slope −1
and for each 𝑎 ∈]𝜆, 3
2𝜆], the line that passes through (0,𝑎) and whose slope is that of
seg[(0,𝑎),𝑡(𝑎)], namely, −
𝑎−𝑡2(𝑎)
𝑡1 , intersects at 𝗽 the line that passes through (0,𝜆) with
slope −1.
Let ˜ 𝑅1 ∈ℋbe the homothetic preference for which 𝐼( ˜ 𝑅1,(0, 3
2𝜆)) ≡ 𝐼( ˆ 𝑅1,(0, 3
2𝜆)). For
each 𝑎 ∈]3
2𝜆,+∞[⊂ ℝ+,l e t𝐼( ˆ 𝑅1,(0,𝑎)) ≡ 𝐼( ˜ 𝑅1,(0,𝑎)). Finally, let ˆ 𝑅2 ≡ ˆ 𝑅1.
Claim 1: ˆ 𝑅1 ∕∈ℐ . Indeed, (0,𝜆) is a maximizer for ˆ 𝑅1 at prices (1,1), and for each
0 ⪇ Δ ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ such that ∣∣(0,𝜆) − Δ∣∣ < 1
2,( 0 ,𝜆) + Δ is not a maximizer for ˆ 𝑅1 at prices
(1,1). Thus, no quasi-strictlyincreasing path of maximizers of ˆ 𝑅1 at prices (1,1) passes
through (0,𝜆)( F i g u r e3 (b)).
Let 𝑧1 ≡ (𝜆,0) and 𝑧2 ≡ (0,𝜆).
Claim 2: ( ˆ 𝑅,𝑧) ∈??⟨ 𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.N o t e t h a t 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸( ˆ 𝑅). Thus, byLemma 8,
it is enough to show that for each 𝑅′
1 ∈ℛsuch that 𝑒1(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2)𝑃 0
1 𝑧1,a n de a c h𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+
supporting 𝑈𝑐( ˆ 𝑅2,𝑒 2(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2)) at 𝑒2(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2), 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑒 1(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2)) <𝑎 (𝑅2,𝑒 2(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2)), and the
parallel statement obtained byexchanging the roles of the two agents hold.
We prove the ﬁrst statement of Claim 2. Let 𝑅′
1 ∈ℛand 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ be as speciﬁed above.
Let ˜ 𝑧 ≡ 𝑒(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2). We prove that 𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑒 1(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2)) <𝑎 (𝑅2,𝑒 2(𝑅′




1 >𝜆and ˜ 𝑧1 ≪ Ω. Then, the unique 𝑝 (up to a positive scale
transformation) supporting 𝑈𝑐( ˆ 𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)a t˜ 𝑧2 is (1,1). Since ˜ 𝑧1
2 +˜ 𝑧2
2 <𝜆 ,t h e n𝑎(𝐿(1,1), ˜ 𝑧1) <
𝑎(𝐿(1,1), ˜ 𝑧2)=𝑎(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2).
Case 2:˜ 𝑧1
1 +˜ 𝑧2
1 >𝜆and ˜ 𝑧1
1 = 𝜆. The claim is clearlytrue if ˜𝑧1 = Ω. Suppose now
that ˜ 𝑧1 ∕=Ω . T h u s ,˜ 𝑧2
1 <𝜆and for each 𝑝 supporting 𝑈𝑐( ˆ 𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)a t˜ 𝑧2,w eh a v e𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝2.
Thus, 𝑈𝑐(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) ⊆ 𝑈𝑐(𝐿(1,1), ˜ 𝑧1)a n d𝑎(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) <𝑎 (𝐿(1,1), ˜ 𝑧2)=𝑎(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2).
Case 3:˜ 𝑧1
1 +˜ 𝑧2
1 >𝜆 ,˜ 𝑧2
1 = 𝜆,a n d˜ 𝑧1 ∕= Ω. A symmetric argument to the one in Case 2
shows that for each 𝑝 supporting 𝑈𝑐( ˆ 𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)a t˜ 𝑧2, 𝑎(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) <𝑎 (𝐿(1,1), ˜ 𝑧2)=𝑎(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2).
Case 4:˜ 𝑧1
1 +˜ 𝑧2
1 = 𝜆. Then, ˜ 𝑧1
2 +˜ 𝑧1
2 = 𝜆.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e˜ 𝑧1 𝑃 0
1 𝑧1,t h e n˜ 𝑧2
2 <𝜆 .T h u s ,
the unique 𝑝 (up to positive scale transformations) supporting 𝑈𝑐( ˆ 𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)a t˜ 𝑧2 is (1,1).
19Since 𝑧1 𝑃 0
1
Ω
2 and 𝑒 is an equal-division selector, then (Ω
2, Ω
2) ∕∈ 𝐸(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2), for otherwise
𝑒(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2)=( Ω
2, Ω
2). Thus, 𝑝 supports 𝑈𝑐(𝑅′
1, ˜ 𝑧1)a t˜ 𝑧1, 𝑎(𝑅′
1, ˜ 𝑧1) <𝑎 (𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1)=𝑎( ˆ 𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2),
and ˜ 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝐸(𝑅′
1, ˆ 𝑅2). Thus, this case cannot occur.
















































































Figure 3: Example 3. In order to help visualize our geometrical argument, we have exaggerated the
distance between ˜ 𝑧1 and (𝜆,0) in Panel (c) with respect to preferences shown in Panel (a).
Case 5:˜ 𝑧1
1+˜ 𝑧2
1 <𝜆(Figure 3 (c)). Then, ∣∣˜ 𝑧1−𝑧1∣∣ <
1
2 and the unique 𝑝 (up to positive
scale transformations) supporting 𝑈𝑐(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)a t˜ 𝑧2 is (𝑝1,𝑝 2)w h e r e𝑝1 =˜ 𝑧2






2, i.e., the normal vector to the line that pases through ˜ 𝑧2 and 𝗽 (Figure 3 (b)).
Let 𝗾 ≡ 𝐼(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) ∩ seg[(0,𝜆),(𝜆,0)] and 𝗿 =( 𝗿1,𝗿2) ≡ 𝐼(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) ∩ 𝐼(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2). Note that
∣∣𝗾 − (𝜆,0)∣∣ =2a n d𝗿2 ≤ 2
√
2. We claim that 𝑎(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) <𝑎 (𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2). This is equivalent
to 𝜇(𝑈𝑐(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2) ∖ 𝑈𝑐(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1)) >𝜇 (𝑈𝑐(𝐿𝑝, ˜ 𝑧1) ∖ 𝑈𝑐(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)), i.e., from the measures of the
two shaded sets forming a bow-tie in Figure 3 (c), the measure of the upper set is greater
than the measure of the lower one. Indeed, let 𝑚 ≡
√
2𝜆 − 4. Then, the upper set is a









We now prove the second statement of Claim 2, i.e., for each 𝑅′
2 ∈ℛsuch that
𝑒2( ˆ 𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)𝑃 0
2 𝑧2,a n de a c h𝑝 ∈ ℝ2
+ supporting 𝑈𝑐(𝑅1,𝑒 1( ˆ 𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)) at 𝑒1( ˆ 𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2),
𝑎(𝐿𝑝,𝑒 2( ˆ 𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)) <𝑎 (𝑅1,𝑒 2( ˆ 𝑅1,𝑅 ′
2)). A symmetric argument to Cases 1, 2, and 3 above
proves this statement (there is no counterpart of Cases 4 and 5.)
Now, we smooth out ˆ 𝑅 and construct 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁 such that (𝑅,𝑧)=??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩
and 𝑧 = ??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩. The onlypoints at which the indiﬀerence sets of ˆ 𝑅1 and ˆ 𝑅2
have multiple supporting lines are {𝑡(𝑎):𝜆<𝑎<3
2𝜆} and the half line starting at 𝑡(3
2𝜆)
with direction 𝑡(3
2𝜆). For a small 𝜀>0 there are smooth preferences, say 𝑅1 and 𝑅2,
whose indiﬀerence sets “coincide” with the indiﬀerence sets of ˆ 𝑅1 and ˆ 𝑅2 outside each
open ball with radius 𝜀 and centered at each of these “kinks” (Figure 3 (d)). Moreover,
if 𝜀 is small enough, then the same argument that shows that ( ˆ 𝑅,𝑧)=??⟨𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩
and 𝑧 = ??⟨𝑆(ℛ)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ c a nb eu s e dt os h o wt h a t( 𝑅,𝑧)=??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩ and
𝑧 = ??⟨𝑆(??)𝑁,𝐸𝑒,𝑅 0⟩.18
Concluding: Observe that 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃(𝑅0). Thus, 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑊 𝑐
𝑒𝑑(𝑅0).□
7 Concluding comment and a conjecture
Our results have implications for what is called “implementation” – for introductions and
surveys, see Corch´ on (1996), Jackson (2001), and Maskin and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2002). A “game
form” consists of a proﬁle of strategyspaces, one for each agent, and an outcome function,
a function that associates with each preference proﬁle an allocation. Once a preference
proﬁle is given, we have a “game.” A game form “implements a solution” if for each
preference proﬁle, the set of equilibrium allocations of the resulting game coincides with
the set of allocations that the solution would select for this proﬁle. Thus, our main result
18Formally, since 𝜆>4
√
2, there is 𝑅2 ∈??such that: (i) for each 𝑎 ∈ [0,𝜆] ⊂ ℝ+, 𝐼(𝑅2,(0,𝑎)) ≡
𝐼( ˆ 𝑅2,(0,𝑎)); (ii) there is 0 <𝜀<
√
2
2 𝑚 − 2
√
2 such that for each 𝑎 ∈]𝜆, 3
2𝜆] ⊂ ℝ+, 𝐼(𝑅2,(0,𝑎)) ∩{ 𝑦 ∈
ℝ𝐾
+ : ∣∣𝑦 − 𝑡(𝑎)∣∣ <𝜀 }≡𝐼( ˆ 𝑅2,(0,𝑎)) ∩{ 𝑦 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ : ∣∣𝑦 − 𝑡(𝑎)∣∣ <𝜀 }; and (iii) for each ˜ 𝑧2 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+ such that
∣∣(0,𝜆) − ˜ 𝑧2∣∣ < 1
2 and ˜ 𝑧1
2 +˜ 𝑧2
2 >𝜆 , the positive normal vector to the the line that passes through ˜ 𝑧2 and
𝗽 supports 𝑈𝑐(𝑅2, ˜ 𝑧2)a t˜ 𝑧2.
21can be seen as providing an implementation of the equal-division constrained Walrasian
solution.
Since the pioneering work of Hurwicz, a varietyof game forms have been deﬁned achiev-
ing this objective, under a range of requirements on the game form and on the domain
of admissible preferences. For some of these game forms, strategyspaces are ﬁnite di-
mensional Euclidean spaces. One can argue that from the viewpoint of simplicity, such
game forms are preferable to the game form associated with the equal-sacriﬁce rule. Con-
sequently, we do not emphasize the fact that our game form provides an implementation
of this solution.
An extension of our results to situations where agents have individual endowments is
possible, although adapting the deﬁnition of the equal-sacriﬁce solution itself is not entirely
straightforward. The following appears the most natural to us. Consider an allocation that
each agent ﬁnds at least as desirable as her endowment. Then, for each agent, identify
the consumption bundles that she could receive at an allocation that each agent ﬁnds at
least as desirable as her endowment. Then, calculate the ratio of the size of the subset
of bundles that she ﬁnds at least as desirable as her assigned bundle to the size of the
subset of these bundles that she ﬁnds at least as desirable as her endowment. Finally,
select the allocations at which these ratios are all equal. We conjecture that under the
same assumptions on the domain, and for each preference proﬁle, the set of equilibrium
allocations of the manipulation game associated with this rule is the set of constrained
Walrasian allocations for that proﬁle.
Appendix
Lemma 9. ℋ ⊊ ℐ.
Proof. We show that ℋ ⊊ ℐ bymeans of an example in ℝ2
+. We construct 𝑅0 ∈ℐsuch that
𝑅0 ∕∈ℋ . Let us deﬁne 𝑅0 ∈ℐ .F o re a c h𝑎 ∈ [0,1] ⊂ ℝ+,l e t𝐼(𝑅0,(0,𝑎)) ≡ 𝐼(𝐿(1,1),(0,𝑎)).








Claim: 𝑅0 ∈ℐ , i.e., for each 𝑥0 ∈ ℝ2
+ and each 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾
++ such that 𝑥0 is a maximizer
for 𝑅0 at prices 𝑝, there is a quasi-strictlyincreasing path of maximizers of 𝑅0 at prices 𝑝
that passes through 𝑥0. There are three cases.
Case 1: 𝑥1
0 −1 ≥ 𝑥2







































Figure 4: Lemma 9.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let 𝑅 ∈??and Θ ≡
∏𝐾
𝑡=1 Ω𝑡. Observe that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,t h e
function 𝑢𝑖, deﬁned by 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+  → Θ−𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑥 𝑖), is a continuous representation of 𝑅𝑖.L e t
Φ(𝑅) ≡{ 𝜈 ∈ ℝ+ :t h e r ei s𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 s.t. for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝜈}. Since Θ ∈ Φ(𝑅),
then Φ(𝑅) is non-empty. Clearly, Φ(𝑅) ≡{ 𝜈 ∈ ℝ+ :t h e r ei s𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 s.t. for each 𝑖 ∈
𝑁, Θ − 𝑢(𝑧𝑖)=𝜈}. Continuityof 𝑢 implies that Φ(𝑅) is closed. Since Φ(𝑅) is bounded,
then it is compact. Let 𝜈∗ ≡ minΦ(𝑅). Since 𝜈∗ ∈ Φ(𝑅), then there is 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 such that for
each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝜈∗.M o r e o v e r ,𝑧 ∈ Ψ(𝑅). Let 𝑧′ ∈ Ψ(𝑅). Then, the common value
of 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖)f o r𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,i si nΦ ( 𝑅). Thus, for each {𝑖,𝑗}⊆𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝑣∗ ≤ 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗).
Thus, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅).
Let {𝑧,𝑧′}⊆𝐸(𝑅). Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Bydeﬁnition of 𝐸, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖)=𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖). Thus,
𝑢𝑖(𝑧𝑖)=𝑢𝑖(𝑧′
𝑖). Since 𝑢𝑖 represents 𝑅𝑖,t h e n𝑧𝑖 𝐼𝑖 𝑧′
𝑖.T h u s ,𝐸 is essentially single-valued.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let 𝑅 ∈?? 𝑁 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅). We proceed in three steps.
(i) ?? ∈ 𝑷 ??(𝑹). Suppose bycontradiction that there is 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍 such that for each
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′
𝑖 𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖.L e t𝜈 ≡ max𝑗∈𝑁 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧′
𝑗). Thus, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖) ≤ 𝜈<𝑎 (𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖).
23Since for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,0) ≥ 𝜈 and preferences are monotone and continuous, then by
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is 𝑧′′ ∈ 𝑍 such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧′′
𝑖 )=𝜈.
Thus, 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝐸(𝑅). This is a contradiction.
(iia) If ∣𝑵∣ = 2, then, 𝑬(𝑹) ⊆ 𝑷(𝑹). Suppose bycontradiction that there is
𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅) such that 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃(𝑅). Then, there are 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 such that 𝑧′
𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝑧𝑖
and 𝑧′
𝑗 𝑃𝑗 𝑧𝑗. Since preferences are monotone, we can assume w.l.o.g. that 𝑧′
𝑖 +𝑧′
𝑗 =Ω .W e
claim that Ω𝑃𝑖 𝑧′
𝑖.S i n c e 𝑧 ∈ 𝑃 𝑤(𝑅), then 𝑧′
𝑖 𝐼𝑖 𝑧𝑖. Suppose bycontradiction that 𝑧′
𝑖 𝐼𝑖 Ω.
Then, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧′
𝑖) = 0 and thus, 𝑎(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖) = 0. Since 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅), then 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧 𝑗)=0 . B u t ,
since 𝑧′
𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝑐(𝑃𝑗,𝑧 𝑗), then 𝑎(𝑅𝑗,𝑧 𝑗) > 0. This is a contradiction. Now, since preferences
are continuous, then there is 𝗼 ∈ (0,1) such that (1 − 𝗼)𝑧′





𝑗 =( 1− 𝗼)𝑧′




𝑖. Since preferences are monotone, then (𝑧′
𝑖+𝗼𝑧′
𝑗)𝑃𝑖 𝑧′





𝑗 ≡ (1 − 𝗼)𝑧′
𝑗.S i n c e𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍,t h e n𝑧′′ ∈ 𝑍.S i n c e𝑧′′
𝑖 𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖
and 𝑧′′
𝑗 𝑃𝑗 𝑧𝑗,t h e n𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃 𝑤(𝑅). This is a contradiction.
(iib) If 𝑹 ∈퓡 𝑵, then, 𝑬(𝑹) ⊆ 𝑷(𝑹).
We ﬁrst prove that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,Ω𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0. Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Since preferences are semi-
strictlymonotone and 𝑧𝑖 ≤ Ω, then 𝑧𝑖 𝐼𝑖 Ω implies 𝑧𝑖 =Ω .T h u sΩ𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖, for otherwise for
each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖}, 𝑧𝑗 = 0. We prove now that 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0. Suppose bycontradiction that 𝑧𝑖 𝐼𝑖 0.
Since preferences are continuous and monotone and 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅), then for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑖},
𝑧𝑗 𝐼𝑗 0. Since for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, Ω
𝑛 𝑃𝑗 0, then 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃 𝑤(𝑅). This is a contradiction.
Now, suppose bycontradiction that there is 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅) such that 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃(𝑅). Then,
there is 𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍 such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′
𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝑧𝑖 and for some 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′
𝑗 𝑃𝑗 𝑧𝑗.N o w ,
since preferences are continuous, then there is 𝗼 ∈ (0,1) such that (1 − 𝗼)𝑧′
𝑗 𝑃𝑗 𝑧𝑗.S i n c e
𝑧′
𝑗 𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑗 𝑃𝑗 0, then 𝑧′
𝑗 ∕=0 . L e t𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ∖{ 𝑗}.S i n c e 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 and 𝑧′




𝑗)𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖.L e t 𝑧′′ be the allocation deﬁned by: 𝑧′′
𝑗 ≡ (1 − 𝗼)𝑧′
𝑗,a n df o re a c h





𝑗.S i n c e𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍,t h e n𝑧′′ ∈ 𝑍. Since for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧′′
𝑖 𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖,
then 𝑧 ∕∈ 𝑃 𝑤(𝑅). This is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁 and 𝑧 ∈ 𝐸(𝑅). Since 𝑅 ∈ℛ 𝑁, then byLemma 1,
𝑧 ∈ 𝑃(𝑅).
∙ (i) For each ?? ∈ 𝑵,Ω𝑷?? ???? 𝑷?? 0. See (iib) in the proof of Lemma 1.
∙ (ii)
∑
??∈𝑵 ???? =Ω .S i n c e𝑧 ∈ 𝑃(𝑅), preferences are semi-strictlymonotone, and for
each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0, then
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑧𝑖 =Ω .
∙ (iii) There is ?? ∈ ℝ𝑲
++ such that for each ?? ∈ 𝑵, ?? ∈ Supp(𝑹??,?? ??).S i n c e
𝑧 ∈ 𝑃(𝑅), then bythe Second Theorem of Welfare Economics ( Mas-Colell et al., 1995,
Proposition 16.D.1), there is 𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐾 ∖{0} and a vector of wealth levels (𝑤𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 ∈ ℝ𝑁,s u c h
that: (i)
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑝⋅Ω and (ii) for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝐾
+,i f𝑥𝑃 𝑖 𝑧𝑖,t h e n𝑝⋅𝑥 ≥ 𝑤𝑖.
24Since preferences are monotone and for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0, then it is not the case that
𝑝 ≤ 0. Thus, bysemi-strict monotonicityof preferences, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧𝑖 ≥ 𝑤𝑖.S i n c e
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑧𝑖 =Ωa n d
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑝 ⋅ Ω, then for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖. We claim that 𝑝 ≥ 0.
Suppose bycontradiction that there is 𝑘 ∈{ 1,...,𝐾} such that 𝑝𝑘 < 0. Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.F o r
each 𝗿 ∈ ℝ++, 𝑝 ⋅ (𝑧𝑖 + 𝗿1𝑘) <𝑤 𝑖. Moreover, since preferences are semi-strictlymonotone
and 𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0, then (𝑧𝑖 + 𝗿1𝑘)𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖. This is a contradiction. We claim that 𝑝 ≫ 0. Suppose
bycontradiction that there is 𝑙 ∈{ 1,...,𝐾} such that 𝑝𝑙 = 0. Recall that 𝑝 ∕=0 . S i n c e
∑
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑧𝑖 = Ω, then there are 𝑘 ∈{ 1,...,𝐾} and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 such that 𝑝𝑘 > 0a n d𝑧𝑘
𝑖 > 0.
Let 𝗿 ∈ ℝ++.T h u s ,𝑝 ⋅ (𝑧𝑖 + 𝗿1𝑙)=𝑤𝑖. Since preferences are semi-strictlymonotone and
𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0, then (𝑧𝑖 +𝗿1𝑙)𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖.L e t𝜀 ∈ ℝ++ be such that 𝜀<𝑧 𝑘
𝑖 .T h u s ,( 𝑧𝑖 +𝗿1𝑙−𝜀1𝑘) ∈ ℝ𝐾
+.
Bycontinuityif preferences, if 𝜀 is small enough, then (𝑧𝑖 + 𝗿1𝑙 − 𝜀1𝑘)𝑃𝑖 𝑧𝑖.S i n c e𝑝𝑘 > 0,
then 𝑝 ⋅ (𝑧𝑖 + 𝗿1𝑙 − 𝜀1𝑘) <𝑤 𝑖. This is a contradiction.
Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.S i n c e𝑝 ≫ 0a n d𝑧𝑖 𝑃𝑖 0, then 𝑝𝑖⋅𝑧𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 > 0. A simple argument (Mas-Colell
et al. (1995), Proposition 16.D.2) shows that since 𝑤𝑖 > 0, then 𝑝 ∈ Supp(𝑅𝑖,𝑧 𝑖).
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